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This paper reports evidence that parental value of charter schools is primarily 
determined by the schools’ academically effectiveness.   Data on the New Jersey charter 
schools indicate that not all charter schools are equally effective, measured by student test 
scores, or equally valued, measured by the number of students on their waiting list.  The 
charter school value model estimates the effect of tests score, student demographics and 
school characteristics for both the charter school and the home district traditional public 
schools.  The estimates indicate that the charter school test scores have the largest and 
most robust effect on the size of the waiting list.  Neither the charter school students’ race 
or income nor traditional public school students’ test scores affect charter school parental 
value.  Thus this research supports a basic tenet for competitive, market based public 
school improvement: parents choose academically effective schools.   
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Why have charter schools, thus parents’ preferences for charter schools, increased 
dramatically in recent years when many studies conclude that students in charter schools 
do not score as highly on tests as students in traditional public schools? Perhaps parents 
value other aspects of charter schools more highly than students’ performance on 
standardized tests, such as more instructional time, more discipline or more specialized 
educational programs.  Or perhaps parents do not believe a charter school will provide an 
inferior education for their child; some analyses conclude charter school students perform 
as well as or better than public school students and these studies may be more consistent 
with parents’ perception of charter schools. 
The policy prescription that competitive pressure on public schools will improve 
educational outcomes depends on parental choice.  Milton Friedman [62] argued that 
choice for public school students would stimulate public schools to be more academically 
effective, commonly measured by higher standardized tests scores.
1  The market driven 
public school improvement follows from three tenets: 1) parents dissatisfied with 
traditional public schools choose more effective schools; 2) their choice causes effective 
schools to prosper and expand, taking students from ineffective traditional public schools; 
3) traditional schools respond to the loss of students by improving effectiveness in order 
to keep students.
2   These later two channels for market driven public education 
improvement have attracted extensive, and inconclusive, research on the effectiveness of 
charter schools, the largest choice school type.  Research into what attracts parents to 
charter schools is less extensive, but no less important.  This paper provides evidence that   2
the value parents place on charter schools depends primarily on their effectiveness, 
measured by student tests score, providing support for market driven improvement in 
public school effectiveness.   
Charter schools are the most numerous choice schools because they are public 
schools, hence do not involve public funding for private school issues, and do not charge 
tuition.  In comparison to traditional public schools, the charter public schools offer 
alternative modes of instruction and often embrace different philosophies and methods to 
foster innovation and improvement in public schools.  First established in Minnesota in 
1991, these public schools are issued a contract, or charter, which specify the philosophy 
and goals of the school and the method of achieving the goals.  Typically, the schools are 
exempt from many regulations and requirements that govern most public schools to 
provide an alternative method of instruction, as detailed in the school’s charter.   These 
schools are reviewed periodically and the charter may be revoked if the schools do not 
attract enough students to maintain fiscal solvency, meet their specified goals or are 
mismanaged.
3  This alternative to the traditional public school is gaining popularity: in 
2006, there were 3947 charter schools in 40 states, an 11% increase in the number of 
schools since 2005. 
The positive charter school assessment by parents that drives this growth contrasts 
with the ambiguous assessment from research on charter schools academic effectiveness, 
both for students who move from and students who stay in traditional public schools.  In 
October 2006, a widely publicized analysis of the National Assessment of Educational 
Progress (NAEP) test of fourth grade students conducted by H. Braun, F. Jenkins & W. 
Grigg (2006), researchers at the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES),   3
indicated that charter schools students scored 4.2 % lower in reading and 4.7 % lower in 
math than students of noncharter public schools, after accounting for several individual 
student characteristics.  Bulifco and Ladd (2006) found similar results in an analysis of 
North Carolina charter school students.  Hanushek, Kain, Rivkin & Branch (2007) and 
Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg & Jansen (2007) conclude that there is no difference 
between Texas charter school student performance and traditional public school student 
performance on standardized tests, after an initial 2 to 3 year adjustment period during 
which charter school students underperformed.  Using nationwide data, Caroline Hoxby 
[2004] concludes that charter school student’s score higher on standardize tests than 
traditional public school students after accounting for student differences in race, family 
income and other characteristics.  Research on the effect of charter school competition on 
local schools is also ambiguous.  Analysis of national data by Caroline Hoxby (2004) 
indicates charter school competition increases the test scores of traditional public school 
students.  Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg & Jansen (2004) finds that competition from 
Texas charter schools increases the test scores of noncharter public school students.  
Bettinger (2005) concludes that charter school competition has no effect on the scores of 
Michigan noncharter public school students.     
Whether public school improvement will result from charter school competition 
depends on parental motivations for school choice.  Choice of a school with higher 
performing students will cause these schools to prosper and expand, displacing schools 
with poor performing students and creating incentives for traditional schools to improve 
student performance.  However, if parents are motivated to choose charter schools by 
ineffective traditional public schools, by the race or income of the traditional public   4
schools or by the charter school’s unconventional education philosophy, not by the 
academic qualities of the charter school, choice may not improve educational 
opportunities for students who remain in traditional schools.  For example, if a charter 
school emphasizes “harmonizing with the environment” and draws students from 
ineffective traditional public schools, the traditional school may respond to parental 
preferences with a more environmental enriched curriculum, not a more academically 
challenging curriculum.  Thus, whether parents are attracted to a charter school by 
students’ academic performance or repelled by the performance of the alternative 
traditional public school determines how the traditional public schools adapt to 
competition. 
Surveys of parents who choose between private schools, traditional public schools 
and alternative public schools find the most cited factor is students’ scores on 
standardized tests.
4  However, other factors are important, depending on school location 
and parental demographics.  Parents in higher income locations often cite other measures 
of academics, for example the number of honors classes.  Parents in low income areas 
often cite safety and hours of instruction.  Some studies of parent’s actions, not words, 
suggest that race and income play a prime roll in charter school choice.  Weither and 
Tedin (2002) analyze over 1000 Texas students who changed from traditional public 
schools to charter schools.  In surveys, their parents indicated educational effectiveness 
was the prime motivation for changing schools.  However, comparisons of the students’ 
prior public school with the students’ current charter school reveal students moved to 
schools with lower average test scores, with higher income peers and with more racial 
segregation.  Similar race and income peer effects are found by Lankford, et al (1995) in   5
their analysis of the private/public school choice.   Hanushek, et al (2007) analyze over 
20,000 panel observations on Texas students who change schools and reach the opposite 
conclusion: parental school choices are motivated by school effectiveness. They find that 
exits from both charter schools to traditional public schools and exits from tradition 
public schools to charter schools are inversely related to test scores and the magnitude of 
the effect for the movers from charter schools is higher.  They conclude that the choice to 
leave a charter school depends on the academic effectiveness of the charter school.  
This paper provides a unique analysis of parental valuation of charter schools by 
measuring the preference for a charter school using its waiting list.  Charter schools that 
have more applications than seats determine admission by a random drawing and 
unsuccessful lottery participants are put on a waiting list.  The waiting list data allows the 
charter school’s value to be determined by preferences of all the parents who apply, not 
only those parents who win the admissions lottery and enroll their children in the charter 
school.  For the New Jersey charter schools analyzed, the wait list average is 184 students 
and the average number of opening for new students is 40, so the preferences of nearly 
80% of parents who desire a particular charter school would not be represented in 
analysis limited to charter school parents.  Further even if the winners and losers of the 
admissions lottery have similar characteristics and preferences, there is no reason to think 
that the characteristics of the charter schools that have a waiting list of several hundred 
are similar to the characteristics of the charter schools that do not have a waiting list.   
The analysis of charter school parents would give equal weight to oversubscribed and 
undersubscribed charter schools with similar enrollments.   6
The analysis presented here indicates that academic achievement, measured by 
students’ performance on standardized tests, primarily determines the value that parents 
place on New Jersey charter schools.  The estimated effect of charter school test scores is 
the largest in magnitude and robust over different models and sample sizes.  Also, models 
identify other characteristics of the schools, such as educational spending, instructional 
time, class size and faculty teaching ratios, as less important but sometimes significant 
factors determining the size of the waiting list.  The school district traditional public 
schools students’ performance on standardized exams, the characteristics of theses 
schools and its students, except for the percent of poor students and educational spending, 
do not significantly affect charter school value as expected.  Thus this analysis provides 
support for a basic tenet of the belief school choice and market forces can improve the 




Measuring the value parents attach to a charter school based on parents’ actions is 
problematic because charter schools do not charge tuition or discriminate based on 
entrance exam scores or other measures of academic accomplishment.  Schools that offer 
parents valued educational philosophy and instructional methods will be more preferred 
and will have more applications for admission than schools that do not match parent 
preferences.  A private school or a public magnet school that has more applications than 
seats rations by raising tuition or raising minimum entrance scores or both; these 
variables measure parents’ valuation of the school.  If the charter school is   7
oversubscribed, the school conducts a lottery; students not chosen are placed on a waiting 
list.  Parents will apply for admission to a charter school if the expected benefits of 
applying exceed the implicit application costs they incur.
5  The expected benefits derive 
from both the value of charter school attendance and the likelihood of a successful 
application. The waiting list proxies for the unobservable parental valuation because 
longer waiting lists reduce the likelihood of a successful application thus charter schools 
with longer waiting lists must have a higher valuation in order for parents to incur 
application costs. 
The model relates the waiting list [WAIT], to test scores, school resources and the 
characteristics of students and schools, both charter schools and the alternative traditional 
public schools:  
WAITi,t  =  f(SCORESi,t , SCORESd,t,  STUDENTS i,t ,STUDENTS d,t,, SCHOOLS i,t, 
SCHOOLS d,t),   
Where WAITi,t is the number of students wait listed for charter school i at time t.  Parents 
choose to apply to charter schools based on the academic performance of students.  The 
test scores of students at charter school i at time t are SCORESi,t ; the test scores of  
students at the traditional public school in the home district of the charter school are 
SCORESd,t.   The valuation model includes characteristics of students at both the charter 
school and the district schools and characteristics of the schools.  Student characteristics, 
STUDENTS, notably race and income, may determine choice.  School characteristics, 
SCHOOL, included in this analysis are resources measured by expenditures, class size, 
teacher salary, student teacher ratios and instructional time.  Also, suspensions are 
included because parents cited discipline as a factor determining choice.  Because the   8
dependent variable is a nonnegative integer, a Poisson regression estimates the model 
parameters.  The error term is clustered on the school for robust estimates and the number 




This paper analyzes the factors that determine parents’ valuation of New Jersey 
charter schools.  New Jersey is a good source of school data for several reasons.  First, 
New Jersey has some of the highest performing 
6 and lowest performing public school 
students in the nation.  In 2003, New Jersey had the highest state median household 
income and also contained three cities, Newark, Jersey City and Patterson, among the 25 
American cities with the highest unemployment rate.  Also, New Jersey public schools 
spend more per student than schools
7 in any other state and spending in urban schools 
with the lowest performing students is higher than spending in suburban schools with the 
highest performing students.
8  New Jersey is small but densely populated and has a 
tradition of home rule; there are nearly 600 school districts, which allow parents to 
choose to live in many different locales without changing employment locations.  Finally, 
New Jersey has a high proportion of private schools; in 2005, it had 621 elementary 
nonpublic schools and 1356 public elementary and middle schools.  In general, New 
Jersey parents have a long history of school choice that precedes the national school 
choice movement, as evidenced by the fact that the state ranks second among the fifty 
states in the 2001 Education Freedom Index, Green (2002).
9     9
In 1996, the New Jersey implemented legislation creating charter schools.  These 
charters are issued by the state Department of Education to the founders of the charter 
school with the approval of a home school district, which does not have authority to 
regulate the charter school.  These charter schools are open to any student in the state 
with preference given to students who reside in the home district.  From 1996 to 2006, 73 
schools have been granted charters and, during 2004/2005, 53 charter schools were 
operating.  All New Jersey charter schools are startups; the charter schools do not replace 
existing public schools.  New Jersey, like other states, issues charters to schools whose 
founders have diverse points of emphasis, philosophies and methods, which are specified 
in their mission statements and provide parents information required to make school 
choices.  Also, the charter schools offer different deliveries of education services, such as 
11 month school years and 8am to 5 pm school days.  In short, the charter schools present 
to parents a diverse offering in educational philosophy and implementation. 
The New Jersey charter schools are concentrated in the urban areas, which allows 
parents in these home districts the choice not only between traditional and charter 
schools, but in several cities, the choice between different charter schools.  The data set 
consists of 203 observations over a seven year period, the 1999/2000 to 2005/2006 school 
years, for the 42 charter schools that offered an elementary or middle school 
curriculum.
10  The number of observation per charter schools differs for several reasons: 
some charter schools did not get renewed; some charter schools closed because of 
financial reasons; new charter schools were started and some test scores are not available 
because charter schools did not always include fourth grade or eighth grade and are not 
required to report test scores their initial two years.
11  The analysis includes 2 charter   10
schools which have data for a single school year and 4 charter schools have data for all 
the seven years.  Table 1 details the number of charter schools and the number of data set 
observations by city and whether the city is in a Special Needs District, the low income, 
urban districts designated by the New Jersey Supreme Court for additional state 
funding.
12  In recent years the expenditures per student in several of the Special Needs 
Districts has exceed spending in even the most affluent suburban districts.  Note that 36 
of the 42 charter schools are in Special Needs Districts. Newark parents can, at some time 
before high school, potentially choose among 9 charter schools and Jersey City parents 
can choose among 7 charter schools.  These numbers do not indicate the number of 
choices at each grade level because the charter schools offer various grade levels; for 
example, grade levels include prekindergarten to 12
th grade, pre-k to 2
nd grade and 5
th 
grade to 8
th grade.  Data that represent more than one charter school choice add up to 140 
observations, 72% of the sample. 
This study analyzes parental value of charter schools with school and district level 
data on New Jersey elementary and middle public schools, both charter and traditional, 
over the period 2000-2006, as reported in the state issued New Jersey School Report 
Cards.
13  These Report Cards provide parents with information needed for informed 
choices: test scores, characteristics of the schools’ students, the schools’ resources and 
learning environment, school finances and teacher and staff information.  Most of the 
variables are measured at the school level for three academic years.  The Report Cards 
also include comparable, averaged data for other schools operating in the home district, 
in similar socioeconomic school districts
14 and throughout the state.   These Report Cards   11
are made available to parents, are reported on line at the web sites of the Department of 
Education and major newspapers and are summarized in state newspapers. 
The state requires each charter school to report the number of student on its wait 
list, which is published on the School Report Card.  Schools that have more applications 
than seats available for new students are required to conduct a lottery.  The students who 
are not chosen in the lottery are put on the wait list, with their lottery number, for the 
subsequent school year and are contacted if space becomes available.  The Report Card 
includes three years of wait list and enrollment data, thus provides the information to 
evaluate the likelihood of a successful charter school application.  
The measure of school performance is constructed from the scores on 
standardized tests required by the state of all public school students.  Over the sample 
period the state of New Jersey has tested all public school students in 4
th and 8
th grades in 
both math and language; more recently science has been added to some tests.  The Report 
Card summarizes the results of the annual March tests in three categories: advanced 
proficient, proficient and partially proficient.  The state reports more detailed 
information, including the mean score, in an annual assessment report, also available 
online.  These tests have been changed during the sample period resulting in different 
mean scores.  To facilitate comparisons, each annual school score for math, language and 
science, when available, are standardized with the state school average and standard 
deviation; therefore the scores measure standard deviations from the state average.
15  
Scores in each subject area are averaged for the school score; for schools that test both 4
th 
grade and 8
th grade students, the school score is the average of the two grade level test 
scores.  Test scores are calculated for each grade equivalent traditional public school in   12
the home district and the averaged value provide the measure of the district scores.  These 
test scores are lagged one period to match the time period of other Report Card data.
16 
 Table 2 reports summary statistics for the sample data.  The average number of 
students on the wait list [WAIT] is 186.  The value of WAIT varies from 0 to 1784 and 
WAIT equals 0 for 23 observations and exceeds 500 for 17 observations.  The new 
students that can be enrolled [OPENINGS] averages 40.  The average charter school 
score is .96 standard deviations less than the state average; scores range from -3.15 to 
1.95.  The charters school students’ did not test as well as the students in the home 
district traditional public schools; these students scored .80 standard deviations less than 
the state average.  Demographic measures indicate that charter school students are similar 
to the students in the home district traditional public schools.  Black and Hispanic 
students [MINORITY] comprise 80% of the student body of charter schools and 78% of 
the student body of other district schools.  Students who qualify for subsidized lunches 
[POOR] comprise 60% of charter school students and 61% of other district school 
students.  
The instructional expenditures of New Jersey charter schools are 19% less than 
expenditures at the home district schools.   The average expenditure per student (COST) 
for the charters is $11,310 while the average for the district is $14,000.
17  Faculties at 
charter schools (FACSALARY) are paid nearly 50% less than faculty at home district 
schools.
18    Although the charters have about one more student per faculty member 
[SFRATIO], the charters have nearly 1 less student in the average class [CLASSSIZE].
19 
The average percent of students suspended [SUSPEND]for the charters is 10.8% while 
the home district average is 7.9.
20  The table reports that 72% of the observations come   13
from charter schools in the special needs districts [SPECNEEDS].  The charter schools 
average 382 minutes of instructional time; the state average in 2005 was 339 minutes.
21   
The binary variable ACADEMIC indicates that 25% of the charter schools stress 





Table 3 reports estimates of the charter school value model.  Two version of the 
model are reported, both with and without the characteristics of the home district schools, 
which were usually estimated to be statistically insignificant or to have an effect on 
charter school value opposite what is expected.
23  The models are estimated with four 
different samples.  The full sample results are reported in columns 1 and 2.  Columns 3 
and 4 report the model estimates with the 140 observation sample of charter schools in 
the 7 home districts with more than one charter school, hence parental choice of more 
than one charter school option.  Two charter schools stand out and the models are 
estimated without each one in the sample.  The variable SCORE exceeds 1.25 in only 7 
of the 203 sample observations, all the observations for The Princeton Charter School.  
And WAIT exceeds 900 for 6 observations, which are the 6 observations for North Star 
Academy Charter.  Columns 5 through 8 report estimates based on samples without one 
of these schools.  The table also reports the results of simulations of the estimated model 
to assess the relative importance of some variables on parental value.   The value of a 
variable is increased 1% and the estimated percentage change in WAIT is the elasticity.
24   14
Charter school students test scores primarily determine parental value of charter 
schools.  The number of students on the wait list is positively related to tests scores and 
the magnitude of the effect is large.  For all models and samples, SCORE is statistically 
significant and has the largest effect of WAIT.  The elasticity varies from 5.4 to 8 and 
usually exceeds the elasticity of any other variable by a factor of at least 3.  As reported 
in column 4, SCORE has the largest effect on WAIT in the sample where parental choice 
includes more than 1 charter school: a 1% increase in test scores result in an 8% increase 
in the number of students on the wait list.  Charter school value does not depend on the 
effectiveness of the schools that the parents want their children to leave; the test scores of 
the students at the traditional public school inversely affect value but the impact is not 
statistically significant.  Also, charter schools that stress academics in the mission 
statements are more highly valued, although the effect is not significant at the 5% level.   
The estimated effect of student characteristics on charter school value does not 
suggest parents value charter schools for the racial makeup or economic circumstances of 
the students.  Neither POOR nor MINORITY charter school students has an effect on the 
waiting list.  An increase in the number of POOR students in traditional public schools 
has a statistically significant positive effect in 4 of the 8 estimates, consistent with parents 
wanting to exit these traditional public schools.  However, charter schools do not have 
fewer POOR students, so these estimates do not suggest parents are seeking higher 
income student peers. Increases in district MINORITY students decreases charter school 
value, opposite the prediction of choice based on increasing racial segregation, but this 
estimate is significant in only 2 of 8 estimates.   15
  Parental valuation of the charter schools depends to some extent on the 
characteristics of the charter school, but most of the estimates are not statistically 
significant or robust for different samples.  The variables that most directly measure 
instruction have the largest effects.  The student to faculty ratios has a significant 
negative effect on WAIT in 7 of 8 model estimates.  The elasticity of this effect ranges 
from -1.16 to -.67.  Instructional time has the largest effect on WAIT; a 1% increase in 
INSTTIME is estimated to increase WAIT from 1.9% to 2.6% although the estimate is 
significant in only 4 of 8 models.  Higher charter school spending increases the charter 
schools value as do smaller class sizes; the estimates are statistically significant in one 
model. 
The characteristics of the alternative traditional district public schools do not 
affect value as expected or are not robust.  The estimates indicate the size of the waiting 
list increases with increases in faculty salaries and decreases in student faculty ratios in 
the traditional public schools.  One would expect more faculty resources at home district 
schools would reduce the value of charter schools.  Increases in educational expenditures 
at home district schools decreases the parental valuation of charter schools, as expected, 




This research suggests an answer to the question posed at the start of this paper: 
parents choose charters schools because they value schools that are academically 
effective and endorse academic goals.  This analysis suggests parents are not concerned   16
about the average performance of charter school students.  The New Jersey data analyzed 
here indicate not all charter schools are equally effective, measured by student test scores, 
or equally preferred, measured by waiting lists.  Because the average student tests scores 
at heterogeneous charter schools are above or below student tests scores at traditional 
public schools does not diminish the evidence presented here that charter school value 
depends on academic effectiveness.  This research supports the basic tenet of public 
school improvement through parental choice and competition that parents choose 
academically effective schools.     17
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   TABLE  1   
  CHART SCHOOLS BY SCHOOL DISTRICT 





SCHOOLS OBSERVATIONS.  SPECIAL NEEDS DIST. 
ASBURY PARK  1 4 yes 
ATLANTIC CITY  2 7 yes 
CAMDEN 2 10 yes 
CLIFTON 1 6 no 
EAST ORANGE  1 4 yes 
ENGLEWOOD 1 4 yes 
GALLOWAY 1 4 yes 
HOBOKEN 2 11 yes 
JERSEY CITY  7 39 yes 
MORRIS 1 3 no 
NEW BRUNSWICK  1 6 yes 
NEWARK 9 39 yes 
PATERSON 1 1 yes 
PLAINFIELD 1 3 yes 
PLEASANTVILLE 2 12 yes 
PRINCETON 1 7 no 
RED BANK  1 7 no 
SPARTA 1 6 no 
TEANECK 1 6 no 
TRENTON 5 24 yes 
  
TOTAL 42 203  
   20
    Table 2 
        
   MEANS/  STANDARD  DEVIATIONS     
 VARIABLE        
     
 WAIT   186.32    
   261.02    
     
 OPENINGS  40.04    
   23.22    
     
    S C H O O L    
  CHARTER      DISTRICT 
 
 SCORE   -0.96    -0.79 
   1.16    0.87 
     
       STUDENTS   
  CHARTER     DISTRICT 
 
 MINORITY  79.89    77.65 
   28.53    26.04 
     
 POOR   59.84    61.43 
   25.99    24.83 
     
    S C H O O L    
  CHARTER     DISTRICT 
     
 SFRATIO  11.93    10.61 
   3.32    1.55 
     
 COST   11.31    14.00 
   2.08    2.36 
     
 CLASS  SIZE  17.42    18.03 
   3.96    1.74 
     
 SUSPEND  10.82    7.92 
   12.10    5.37 
     
 FACSALARY  39.15    57.83 
   5.37    12.14 
 
 TIMEINST  381.76    
   41.09    
 
 ACADEMIC  0.25    
   0.43    
     
 SPECNEEDS        0.72 
      0 . 4 5  
     
 NUMBER  203    
      21
Table 2 (continued) 
DEFINITIONS FOR DATA FROM NEW JERSEY SCHOOL REPORT CARD  
WAIT: The list contains numbers of students who are waiting for openings in the charter school 
roster as of the opening of school.  
OPENINGS: Enrollment if first grade level of charter school plus difference in fisrt class grade 
level and sencond grade level. 
SCORE
1: Performance on State Tests Grade Eight Proficiency Assessment (GEPA), New Jersey 
Assessment of Skills and Knowledge (NJASK) 4
TH GRADE 
MINORITY
2: The percentage of Black and Hispanic students. 
POOR
b: The percentage of students who qualify for a  subsidied or free lunch. 
SFRATIO: The ratio of students to faculty 
COST: The total of education related expenditures is divided by the average daily enrollment  
CLASS SIZE: Enrollment per grade divided by the total number of classrooms for that grade.  
SUSPEND: These are percentages of students who were suspended at least once during the 
school year. Students suspended more than one time are counted once. The percents are 
calculated by dividing the total number suspended by the total enrollment.  
 FACSALARY:  This is the median salary faculty 
TIMEINST: This is the amount of time per day that a typical student is engaged in instructional 
activities under the supervision of a certified teacher. 
ACADEMIC: Binary variable =1 if charter school mission statement emphasizes student 
academic performance  
SPECNEEDS: Binary variable =1 if charter school home district is a Special Needs District 
 
Source: NEW JERSEY SCHOOL REPORT CARDS, 2000 to 2006 unless noted. 
1 Sources: New Jersey Department of Education Assessment Reports, 1999 to 2005 
b Sources: New Jersey Department of Education Enrollment Reports, 2000 to 2006 
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               T A B L E   3             
           MODEL  ESTIMATES           
COLUMN  1   2   3  4     5  6   7  8  
SAMPLE  FULL               LESS  PRINCETON  LESS  NORTH  STAR 
               S C O R E             
SCORE  0.45  ** 0.45  ** 0.50 ** 0.51 **  0.44 ** 0.43  ** 0.35 ** 0.38 **
  4.64   4.70   4.72  4.72     4.53  4.34   3.62  3.52  
                             
SCORE  D  -0.23   0.05    -0.58     -0.09     -0.23  0.03    -0.18  0.08  
  -0.88    0.16   -1.94  -0.21     -0.86   0.10   -0.67   0.25  
               S T U D E N T S             
MINORITY  0.01   0.01   0.00  0.00     0.01  0.01   0.00  0.00  
  1.03   0.72    -0.01  0.05     1.35  0.94   0.72  0.61  
                             
POOR  0.00   0.00   0.01  0.00     0.00  0.00   0.00   -0.01  
  -0.17   -0.26    0.53   0.25     -0.23  -0.32   -0.53  -0.74  
                             
MINORITY  D  -0.02  *  -0.01    -0.05 ** -0.01     -0.02    0.00    -0.02    0.00  
  -2.03   -0.49   -2.97  -0.68     -1.77  -0.32   -1.57  -0.14  
                               
POOR  D  0.02  *  0.02  **  0.02    0.01     0.02 ** 0.02  ** 0.01     0.01    
  2.41   2.67   1.90  1.80     2.66  2.94   1.30  1.38  
               CHARTERS           
SFRATIO  -0.07  * -0.10  **  -0.06 * -0.08 **  -0.07 * -0.10  **  -0.06    -0.08 * 
  -2.42   -3.22   -2.22  -2.87     -2.32  -3.15   -1.81  -2.50  
                             
FACSALARY  0.01   0.03   0.00  0.02     0.02  0.03   0.01  0.03  
  0.62   1.74   0.13  0.87     0.73  1.65   0.49  1.31  
                             
COST  0.07     0.06    0.07    0.05     0.08 *  0.06    0.06    0.05  
  1.89   1.69   1.76  1.54     2.24  1.77   1.23  1.22  
                             
CLSIZE  -0.06   -0.06   -0.07  -0.07     -0.07 *  -0.07   -0.04  -0.05  
  -1.83   -1.77   -1.65  -1.62     -2.07  -1.91   -1.11  -1.35  
                             
TIMEINST  0.01  * 0.01  * 0.01 * 0.01     0.00    0.01     0.01    0.01 * 
  2.02   1.96   1.98  1.73     1.92  1.89   1.94  2.09  
                             
SUSPENSION  0.01   0.01   0.01  0.01     0.01  0.01   0.00  0.00  
  1.18   1.13   1.02  1.05     1.11  1.04   0.19  0.31  
                             
ACADEMIC  0.53   0.55   0.36  0.42     0.49  0.52   0.34  0.40  
  1.89   1.86   1.03  1.15     1.63  1.71   1.14  1.25  
                             
SPECIAL 
NEEDS  0.26   0.53    -0.39   -0.56     0.34  0.58   0.38  0.67  
  0.79   1.36    -1.03   -1.45     1.12  1.48   1.11  1.49    23
               DISTRICT           
SFRATIO  D  -0.20  **      -0.26 **       -0.17 **    -0.21 **   
  -3.01       -3.58        -2.75      -2.86     
                             
FACSALARY  D  0.03 **     0.04 **      0.03 **    0.03 **   
  2.88       3.02        2.88      2.70     
                             
COST  D  -0.08  *     -0.10 **      -0.09 *     -0.08       
  -2.18       -2.57        -2.63      -1.87     
                             
CLSIZE    D  -0.05       -0.04        -0.05      -0.08     
  -1.19       -0.65        -1.27      -1.79     
                             
SUSPENSION  D  0.02       0.02        0.02      0.03     
  0.98       0.63        1.26      1.81     
                             
CONSTANT 2.27    -1.70    5.04 *  0.38     1.60  -1.95    2.67  -1.92  
  1.55    -1.30   2.29  0.19     0.93   -1.46   1.40   -1.27  
                             
               TABLE  3  [CONT]         
               ELASTICITES          
                             
PREDICTED 
WAIT  186.3   186.3   229.9  229.9     184.7  184.7   150.5  150.5  
                             
SCORE  6.95   7.79   7.79  8.02     6.78  6.66   5.86  5.35  
                             
SFRATIO  -0.85   -0.75   -0.78  -0.99     -0.84  -1.16   -0.94  -0.67  
                               
FACSALARY  0.46    -1.14   0.14  0.96     0.59  1.37   1.09  0.41  
                               
COST  0.82   0.82   0.83  0.61     0.88  0.65   0.62  0.72  
                             
CLSIZE  -1.09    0.13   -1.20  -1.26     -1.24  -1.16   -0.94  -0.74  
                             
TIMEINST  2.05   2.36   2.37  2.61     1.89  2.11   2.63  2.31  
                             
OBSERVATIONS  203       140        196      197     
                             
** (*) significant at the 1% (5%) level                             
                             
D  indicates value for home district schools                     
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Learning Center CS  ATLANTIC CITY  1 0.00 -3.15 -1.34  5.00  96.30 39.78 2
CAMDEN'S PROMISE CS  CAMDEN CITY  4 381.25 -1.45 -1.57  101.25  98.41 87.85 2
CLASSICAL ACADEMY CS 
OF C  CLIFTON CITY   6 11.17 0.54 -0.11 34.17  53.61 24.03 1
LIBERTY ACADEMY CS  JERSEY CITY   6 26.67 -2.15 -0.72  45.83  98.38 67.50 7
DISCOVERY CS  NEWARK CITY   5 215.00 -0.32 -1.34 14.80  93.06 74.05 8
EAST ORANGE 
COMMUNITY CS  EAST ORANGE   4 118.75 -1.12 -0.95  101.75  100.00 77.74 2
ELYSIAN CS OF 
HOBOKEN  HOBOKEN CITY   6 99.83 -0.19 0.11  31.83  48.18 33.21 2
EMILY FISHER CS OF 
ADV. S  TRENTON CITY   6 217.67 -2.25 -1.65  32.33  99.15 89.00 5
ENGLEWOOD ON THE 
PALISADE 
ENGLEWOOD 




TWP.   4 14.00 -1.46 0.18 31.75  43.61 41.53 1
GATEWAY CS  JERSEY CITY   5 90.80 -1.79 -0.78 52.00  96.82 76.79 7
Granville Csa  TRENTON CITY   2 0.00 -2.21 -1.52 46.00 100.00 69.80 5





CITY   6 62.33 -0.61 0.86  22.83  72.12 28.80 1
GRAY CS  NEWARK CITY   5 506.20 -0.92 -1.34 42.20  98.31 72.10 8
HOBOKEN CS  HOBOKEN CITY   5 295.20 -0.39 0.09  20.80  42.93 28.38 2
HOPE ACADEMY CS  ASBURY PARK   4 137.50 -1.91 -1.70  15.50  99.63 68.93 1
INTERNATIONAL CS OF 
TRENT  TRENTON CITY   6 37.17 -1.90 -1.65  11.67  95.70 85.24 5
JERSEY CITY COMM. CS  JERSEY CITY  4 90.25 -1.22 -0.69  47.50  98.53 83.08 7
JERSEY CITY GOLDEN 
DOOR  JERSEY CITY   7 284.29 -1.56 -0.77  55.57  88.61 65.80 6
LADY LIBERTY ACADEMY 
CS  NEWARK CITY   4 169.25 -2.23 -1.27 54.50  99.37 83.84 9
LEAP ACADEMY 
UNIVERSITY C  CAMDEN CITY   6 370.33 -1.54 -1.59 53.33  99.49 88.87 2
LEARNING COMMUNITY 
CS  JERSEY CITY   6 93.50 -0.23 -0.72  36.00  61.14 46.10 7
MARION P. THOMAS CS  NEWARK CITY   4 242.00 -2.04 -1.27  40.50  100.00 55.76 9
NEWARK CS  NEWARK CITY   2 89.50 -1.37 -1.12 62.00 100.00 75.12 9
NEW HORIZONS COMM. 
CS  NEWARK CITY   5 253.80 -2.48 -1.47 83.80  98.92 83.43 8
NORTH STAR ACAD. CS 
OF NE  NEWARK CITY   6 1362.83 -0.29 -1.41 57.33  99.13 87.79 8
OCEANSIDE CS  ATLANTIC CITY   6 129.83 -1.70 -1.37 32.50  98.58 86.81 1




CITY   7 120.86 -0.76 -1.39  28.71  98.95 56.69 2  25
PLEASANTVILLE CS FOR 
AC. 
PLEASANTVILLE 
CITY   5 83.40 -1.79 -1.54  34.80  80.12 65.64 2
PRINCETON CS 
PRINCETON 
REGIONAL   7 231.57 1.62 1.50  23.71  12.08 6.98 1
QUEEN CITY ACADEMY 
CS 
PLAINFIELD 
CITY   3 108.00 -1.36 -1.30 20.00  98.79 50.97 1
THE RED BANK CS 
RED BANK 
BORO   7 62.43 -0.15 -0.39  16.86  50.81 42.71 1
ROBERT TREAT 
ACADEMY CS  NEWARK CITY   5 567.20 0.72 -1.34 51.00  96.89 64.94 8
MARIA L. VARISCO-
ROGERS C  NEWARK CITY   3 52.33 -1.63 -1.21 32.67  94.97 92.93 9
SCHOMBURG CS  JERSEY CITY   4 0.00 -2.59 -0.69 79.75  98.85 74.26 7
SOARING HEIGHTS CS  JERSEY CITY  7 258.43 -0.46 -0.77  18.57  80.20 66.70 6
SUSSEX COUNTY CS 
FOR TECH  SPARTA TWP.   6 14.33 0.25 0.91  47.00  2.97 20.17 1
TEANECK COMMUNITY 
CS  TEANECK TWP.   6 97.83 0.09 0.04  26.83  59.56 9.80 1
TRENTON COMMUNITY 




DISTRICT   3 93.33 -0.13 0.91  9.00  12.70 5.75 1
VILLAGE CS  TRENTON CITY   4 8.50 -0.58 -1.67 34.00  99.43 75.97 5
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notes 
                                                 
1Milton and Rose Friedman formed a foundation to promote school competition and 
provide information and research on school choice.  http://www.friedmanfoundation.org/ 
2 Caroline Hoxby [2004] provides a detailed discussion of the inner workings of the 
“Black Box” that generates market based public school performance increases. 
3 The Center for Education Research reports that 436 charter schools have closed from 
inception to year 2005/2006 academic year, about 11% of charter schools started.  For the 
2005/2006 year, New Jersey had 51 operating Charter Schools and 59 approved charter 
schools; since 1992, 15 New Jersey charter schools have closed. 
[http://www.edreform.com/_upload/cer_charter_survey.pdf] 
4 Laura Hamilton & Kacy Guin [2005] summarize research on parent choice.  
5 The North Star Charter School, one of the 4 schools highlighted in No Excuses  by 
Henry and Abigail Thernstrom, had 1784 students on its waiting list for the 2005/2006 
school year even though it requires a time intensive application procedure, as detailed on 
its web site: “After parents attend an Open House and students attend a Simulated School 
Day, they can obtain an official application for admission to North Star.”  See 
www.uncommonschools.org/nsa/ourSchools/enrollment.html 
6 New Jersey elementary schools are ranked 6 in the nation by PSK12 
[http://www.psk12.com/ ]  
7 New Jersey public schools spent nearly $13,000 per student, more than any other state 
according to an April 2005 Center for Education Reform report. 
[http://www.edreform.com/_upload/CER_state_edstats_snapshot_apr06.pdf]  
8 Of the top ten highest spending districts during the 2004/2005 school year, nine are low 
income, urban districts, designated Special Needs Districts. 
9 The 2001 Index of Educational Freedom reports: “New Jersey, which moved up slightly 
to 2nd place, has strengths across the board. It has many small districts, allowing families 
to move to desired school districts; it offers a wide selection of charter school options; 
and it offers direct subsidies to private schools for certain expenses. New Jersey is also 
relatively accommodating to home-schooling.” 
10 The 4 charter high schools are not included because the state mandated tests are given 
in the fall, not the Spring, and do not have similar characteristics to be comparable to the 
tests in the 4
th and 8
th grade.  The 2 charter schools comprised of grades pre-k to 3 are not 
included because test scores are not available. 
11 Most charter schools started with an initial grade or two and expanded by adding 
higher grades as the original students progressed.  Thus a school that started with first 
grade would not give fourth grade test for three years.  Hanushek, et al (2007) and 
Booker , et al  (2007) conclude charter school effectiveness improves after 2 to 3 years, 
so the New Jersey scores after two years are more informative to parents than initial 
year’s scores. 
12 Coate and VanderHoff (1998) provide details on the historical development of these 
districts. 
13 These Report Cards are available on line at http://education.state.nj.us/rc/ 
14 The state has 10 District Factor Groups based on the 7 socioeconomic characteristics of 
the district.   27
                                                                                                                                                 
15 For all the tests used, the average of the school mean test score is about 220 out of 400 
points and the standard deviation is about 15 points.  The assessment reports were not 
issue for the tests given spring 2003; the means for these tests are estimated from the 
categorical data and regression estimates of the mean on the three categories for the 2004 
tests.  
16 The tests are taken in March, reported to parents in June and school summaries are 
released in December.  The categorical test summaries are published in the Report Card 
with enrollment and other data usually collected during the first half of the school year.  
For example, the 2005/2006 Report Card was released in January 2007 and reported the 
number of students on the wait list as of September 2005 and the results of tests taken in 
March 2006.  The March 2005 tests are summarized in the 2004/2005 Report Card. 
17 These are expenditures for educational purposes but do not include facilities 
expenditures which are often not incurred by district owned traditional public schools.  
Thus, these averages likely understate the funding differences because charter schools, 
unlike traditional public schools, may have to pay rent or capital costs from this funding. 
18 The faculty salary is highly correlated with experience.  Experience is not considered 
separately because the Report Cards detail experience at the particular school only, so the 
average level of experience is substantially lower at the newly created charter schools. 
19 Charters tend to have fewer special education, art, consumer economics and teachers in 
areas other the basic subjects.   
20 This high value for the mean results from four observation in which the SUSPEND 
exceeding 50.  The median number of SUSPEND is 7.2 for charter schools and 6.2 for 
other district schools. 
21 The instructional time is the same for all the home districts so it cannot be used in the 
regression model. 
22 While all mission statements give some mention to academic goals, the statements of 
New Jersey charters indicate they have diversity philosophies and instructional methods.  
The designation of a charter school as ACADEMIC is, therefore, somewhat subjective 
and based on the mission statements that contain wording such as: “rigorous curriculum”; 
“education excellence” and “core curriculum”.  Charter schools not designated 
ADADEMIC have mission statements that contain the following descriptions of 
emphasis: “effective academic and personal development through the use of technology”; 
“prepare a diverse cross section of …children…for success as students, citizen and 
workers”; “’a corridor of learning and productive living’”; “children will be taught to 
read through music”; “A primary focus …is the exploration of the effects of human 
endeavor on our ecosystem”;“.. endeavors to foster ecological literacy”; “will provide … 
an appreciation of the world’s human and natural environment”.   
23 The estimate effects are likely opposite the expected effect due to the state Supreme 
Court imposed spending in the Special Needs Districts and the predominance of charter 
schools in these districts.  A lack of data precludes a more extensive investigation of the 
effects of district school characteristics on charter school value. 
24 The elasticity of SCORE references a 1% increases in the school means not the 
standardized score.  The school mean is about 220, so a 1% increase is 2.2 points. 